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Set-theoretic absoluteness and the revision theory of truth
Studia Logica 68 (1):21-41 (2001)
Abstract
We describe the solution of the Limit Rule Problem of Revision Theory and discuss the philosophical consequences of the fact that the truth set of Revision Theory is a complete 1/2 set.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Solovay-type theorems for circular definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
References found in this work
The Gupta-Belnap systems ${\rm S}^\#$ and ${\rm S}^*$ are not axiomatisable.Philip Kremer - 1993 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (4):583-596.
Alternative revision theories of truth.André Chapuis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):399-423.
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