A paraconsistent theory of belief revision

Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246 (2002)
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This paper presents a theory of belief revision that allows people to come tobelieve in contradictions. The AGM theory of belief revision takes revision,in part, to be consistency maintenance. The present theory replacesconsistency with a weaker property called coherence. In addition to herbelief set, we take a set of statements that she rejects. These two sets arecoherent if they do not overlap. On this theory, belief revision maintains coherence.



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Edwin Mares
Victoria University of Wellington

Citations of this work

Paraconsistent dynamics.Patrick Girard & Koji Tanaka - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):1-14.
Wittgenstein on Incompleteness Makes Paraconsistent Sense.Francesco Berto - 2008 - In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Springer. pp. 257--276.

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References found in this work

In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Natural History of Negation.Laurence R. Horn - 1989 - University of Chicago Press.
A survey of multiple contractions.André Fuhrmann & Sven Ove Hansson - 1994 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (1):39-75.
Assertion, denial, and the liar paradox.Terence Parsons - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):137 - 152.

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