Generalizing empirical adequacy I: multiplicity and approximation

Synthese 191 (14):3195-3225 (2014)
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I provide an explicit formulation of empirical adequacy, the central concept of constructive empiricism, and point out a number of problems. Based on one of the inspirations for empirical adequacy, I generalize the notion of a theory to avoid implausible presumptions about the relation of theoretical concepts and observations, and generalize empirical adequacy with the help of approximation sets to allow for lack of knowledge, approximations, and successive gain of knowledge and precision. As a test case, I provide an application of these generalizations to a simple interference phenomenon



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Sebastian Lutz
Uppsala University

References found in this work

Laws and symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The scientific image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.

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