Synthese 197 (3):1099-1125 (2020)

Authors
Sebastian Lutz
Uppsala University
Abstract
Carnap suggests that philosophy can be construed as being engaged solely in conceptual engineering. I argue that since many results of the sciences can be construed as stemming from conceptual engineering as well, Carnap’s account of philosophy can be methodologically naturalistic. This is also how he conceived of his account. That the sciences can be construed as relying heavily on conceptual engineering is supported by empirical investigations into scientific methodology, but also by a number of conceptual considerations. I present a new conceptual consideration that generalizes Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for analytic–synthetic distinctions and thus widens the realm in which conceptual engineering can be used to choose analytic sentences. I apply these generalized conditions of adequacy to a recent analysis of scientific theories and defend the relevance of the analytic–synthetic distinction against criticisms by Quine, Demopoulos, and Papineau.
Keywords conceptual engineering  explication  methodological naturalism  Carnap sentence  Ramsey sentence
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1653-z
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (11):20-40.

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Citations of this work BETA

Vienna Circle.Thomas Uebel - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Logic as a Methodological Discipline.Gil Sagi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9725-9749.
Theories: Reconsidering Ramsey in the Philosophy of Science.John D. Lehmann - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario

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