Abstract

Parte de las sentencias se basan en razonamientos inductivos, lo que implícitamente nos reconduce a la cuestión del problema de la probabilidad en sede judicial. El Tribunal Constitucional se ha enfrentado en numerosas ocasiones a la tesitura de confrontar la presunción de inocencia con el respeto a la autonomía de la valoración de la prueba por parte de los tribunales. Por ello, ha establecido una serie de requisitos que deben cumplir los razonamientos inductivos para que se consideren constitucionales. El problema que analizamos es que ese canon se basa en arcaísmos, frases hechas y lugares comunes, lo que genera mucha inseguridad en una temática tan susceptible de error, como es la inferencia inductiva ABSTRACT Part of the judgments there is based on inductive reasonings, which implicitly re-leads us to the question of the problem of the probability in judicial headquarters. The Constitutional Court has faced in numerous occasions the attitude to confront the presumption of innocence with the respect to the autonomy of the valuation of the test by the courts. For it, it has established a series of requirements that must fulfill the inductive reasonings in order that they are considered to be constitutional. The problem that we analyze is that this canon bases on archaisms, set phrases and common places, which generates many insecurity in a subject matter so capable of mistake, since it is the inductive inference