Mill's Higher Pleasures and the Choice of Character*: Roderick T. Long

Utilitas 4 (2):279-297 (1992)
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Abstract

J. S. Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures is often thought to conflict with his commitment to psychological and ethical hedonism: if the superiority of higher pleasures is quantitative, then the higher/lower distinction is superfluous and Mill contradicts himself; if the superiority of higher pleasures is not quantitative, then Mill's hedonism is compromised.

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Roderick Long
Auburn University

Citations of this work

Mill on Happiness: A question of method.Antis Loizides - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):302-321.
J. S. mill's revisionist utilitarianism.Don Habibi - 1998 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 6 (1):89 – 114.

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References found in this work

Mill's theory of morality.David Lyons - 1976 - Noûs 10 (2):101-120.
J. S. Mill.Alan Ryan - 1974 - Mind 86 (343):450-452.
Higher and Lower Pleasures.Benjamin Gibbs - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (235):31 - 59.
Introduction.John M. Robson - 1988 - In John StuartHG Mill (ed.), Journals and Debating Speeches. University of Toronto Press.

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