Virtue epistemology and the sources of epistemic value

In Heather D. Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge (2018)
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Abstract

A basic question for virtue epistemology is whether it represents a ‘third force’ – a different source of normativity to that offered by internalism and externalism. It is argued that virtue epistemology does not offer us a distinct source of normativity. It is also argued that virtue theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred state of ‘virtue’. Claims that phronesis can unify a virtues-based axiology are specifically opposed.

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reprint Lockie, Robert (2018) "Virtue epistemology and the sources of epistemic value". In , , pp. : (2018)

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Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
The Ethics of Belief.W. K. Clifford - 1999 - In William Kingdon Clifford (ed.), The ethics of belief and other essays. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. pp. 70-97.
Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.

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