It’s Our Epistemic Environment, Not Our Attitude Toward Truth, That Matters

Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 35 (1):94-111 (2023)
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Abstract

The widespread conviction that we are living in a post-truth era rests on two claims: that a large number of people believe things that are clearly false, and that their believing these things reflects a lack of respect for truth. In reality, however, fewer people believe clearly false things than surveys or social media suggest. In particular, relatively few people believe things that are widely held to be bizarre. Moreover, accepting false beliefs does not reflect a lack of respect for truth. Almost everyone’s beliefs are explained by rationally warranted trust in some sources rather than others. This allows us to explain why people have false beliefs.

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Neil Levy
University of Oxford