Testimony, evidence and interpersonal reasons

Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2333-2352 (2016)
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Abstract

According to the Interpersonal View of Testimony, testimonial justification is non-evidential in nature. I begin by arguing that the IVT has the following problem: If the IVT is true, then young children and people with autism cannot participate in testimonial exchanges; but young children and people with autism can participate in testimonial exchanges; thus, the IVT should be rejected on the grounds that it has over-cognized what it takes to give and receive testimony. Afterwards, I consider what I take to be the two best motivations for the IVT and argue that they both fail. The overarching lesson, then, is that the IVT is unmotivated and false; we should think of testimonial justification as being evidential in nature.

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Nicholas Leonard
University of San Francisco

Citations of this work

Epistemological problems of testimony.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Social epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Assertion and Testimony.Edward Hinchman - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.
Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal.Thomas W. Simpson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):447-459.
Testimonial worth.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2391-2411.

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References found in this work

Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
Knowledge on Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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