Theories of truth which have no standard models

Studia Logica 68 (1):69-87 (2001)
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Abstract

This papers deals with the class of axiomatic theories of truth for semantically closed languages, where the theories do not allow for standard models; i.e., those theories cannot be interpreted as referring to the natural number codes of sentences only (for an overview of axiomatic theories of truth in general, see Halbach[6]). We are going to give new proofs for two well-known results in this area, and we also prove a new theorem on the nonstandardness of a certain theory of truth. The results indicate that the proof strategies for all the theorems on the nonstandardness of such theories are "essentially" of the same kind of structure.

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Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

References found in this work

Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
Model Theory.C. C. Chang & H. Jerome Keisler - 1992 - Studia Logica 51 (1):154-155.

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