What theories of truth should be like (but cannot be)

Philosophy Compass 2 (2):276–290 (2007)
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Abstract

This article outlines what a formal theory of truth should be like, at least at first glance. As not all of the stated constraints can be satisfied at the same time, in view of notorious semantic paradoxes such as the Liar paradox, we consider the maximal consistent combinations of these desiderata and compare their relative advantages and disadvantages.

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10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00070.x

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Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

The Logics of Strict-Tolerant Logic.Eduardo Barrio, Lucas Rosenblatt & Diego Tajer - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (5):551-571.
Truth and Theories of Truth.Panu Raatikainen - 2021 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 217–232..

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.

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