Brain Death, the Soul, and Material Dispositions

Christian Bioethics 28 (1):41-57 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I defend the position argued previously by Germain Grisez and me that total brain death is a valid criterion of death on the grounds that a human being is essentially a rational animal, and a brain-dead body lacks the radical capacity for rational actions. I reply to Josef Seifert’s objection that our positions rest on a reductionist view of the human person, and to other objections concerning the inter-relation between the human soul, its powers, and functions of the brain. I argue that a brain-dead body lacks the material dispositions needed for having the form or soul of a human being.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-08

Downloads
46 (#355,781)

6 months
17 (#161,514)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Patrick Lee
Franciscan University of Steubenville

References found in this work

Summa Theologiae (1265-1273).Thomas Aquinas - 1911 - Edited by John Mortensen & Enrique Alarcón.
Real Essentialism.David S. Oderberg - 2007 - New York: Routledge.
Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics.Patrick Lee & Robert P. George - 2007 - New York ;: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Robert P. George.

View all 16 references / Add more references