Restricted Prioritarianism or Competing Claims?

Utilitas 29 (2):137-152 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I here settle a recent dispute between two rival theories in distributive ethics: Restricted Prioritarianism and the Competing Claims View. Both views mandate that the distribution of benefits and burdens between individuals should be justifiable to each affected party in a way that depends on the strength of each individual’s separately assessed claim to receive a benefit. However, they disagree about what elements constitute the strength of those individuals’ claims. According to restricted prioritarianism, the strength of a claim is determined in ‘prioritarian’ fashion by both what she stands to gain and her absolute level of well-being, while, according to the competing claims view, the strength of a claim is also partly determined by her level of well-being relative to others with conflicting interests. I argue that, suitably modified, the competing claims view is more plausible than restricted prioritarianism.

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-08-27

Downloads
930 (#15,171)

6 months
108 (#39,211)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Benjamin Lange
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

References found in this work

The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..
Equality and priority.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Ratio 10 (3):202–221.
Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.

View all 20 references / Add more references