Abstract

The Parmenides is, especially with respect to its second part, one of Plato's most difficult dialogues. The paper sketches an interpretation which is characterized by the following main points: The interpretation is neither rejectionistic nor compatibilistic, that is, according to it, neither should none of the statements of the 2nd part be taken seriously as an assertion meant to be true, nor are all statements of the 2nd part acceptable as true if correctly interpreted. In the 2nd part of the Parmenides, Plato develops a logical theory - a theory of predication, participation and of the community of ideal forms in general - on mereological foundations; in doing this, he advances far beyond elementary mereological principles. This forces us to revise our views concerning the beginnings of logic. It is due to the incomparably high rank which Plato accorded to the active working-out of insights that Plato presents his results not in an expository manner, but as a web of contradictions. The readers are challenged to find the truth for themselves