The ontology of aspectual shape

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):612-614 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Searle (1990) argues that unconscious intrinsic intentional states must be accessible to consciousness because (1) all intrinsic intentional states have aspectual shape, the of which cannot be explained in a third-person (e.g., neurophysiological) vocabulary, and (2) ontologically, unconscious mental states are neurophysiological processes. This argument confuses three senses of namely, factuality, individuative properties, and phenomenological presence

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,140

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Searle's unconscious mind.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):123-148.
Consciousness and the first person.Itay Shani - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (12):57-91.
Token-identity, consciousness, and the connection principle.Jürgen Schröder - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):615-616.
What is the connection principle?Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):837-45.
Aspectual classes and aspectual composition.H. J. Verkuyl - 1989 - Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1):39 - 94.
Mental Causation and Searle’s Impossible Conception of Unconscious Intentionality.Anthonie W. M. Meijers - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):155-170.
Seeing Shape: Shape Appearances and Shape Constancy.David J. Bennett - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):487-518.
The psycho-physical laws of intentionality.J. T. Whyte - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):295 – 304.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-21

Downloads
18 (#614,184)

6 months
1 (#447,993)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations