Searle's unconscious mind

Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):123-148 (2000)
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In his book The rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a role in psychological explanation



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Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
What Is the Connection Principle?Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):837-845.
Non-reductionism and John Searle’s The Rediscovery of the Mind.Brian J. Garrett & John Searle - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):209.
Why the Connection Argument Doesn’t Work.Robert Van Gulick & John Searle - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):201.

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