Synthese 25 (3-4):334 - 336 (1973)

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In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits
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DOI 10.1007/BF00499685
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Predicting the Unpredictable.S. L. Zabell - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):205-232.

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