Lying and Asserting

Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper argues that the correct definition of lying is that to lie is to assert something one believes to be false, where assertion is understood in terms of the notion of the common ground of a conversation. It is shown that this definition makes the right predictions for a number of cases involving irony, joking, and false implicature. In addition, the proposed account does not assume that intending to deceive is a necessary condition on lying, and hence counts so-called bald-faced lies as lies

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,252

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive.Roy Sorensen - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264.
What Is Lying.Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.
Lying and Deception.Don Fallis - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.
Lying with Conditionals.Roy Sorensen - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):820-832.
Lying and intentions.Gary E. Jones - 1986 - Journal of Business Ethics 5 (4):347-349.
Lies and Dishonest Endorsements.Alexander R. Pruss - 2010 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 84:213-222.
On the definition of lying: A reply to Jones and revisions.Thomas L. Carson - 1988 - Journal of Business Ethics 7 (7):509-514.
Liar Liar.Thomas Carson - 2008 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):189-210.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-08-02

Downloads
443 (#41,825)

6 months
38 (#94,039)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andreas Stokke
Uppsala University

Citations of this work

Lying with Presuppositions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):731-751.
Assertion remains strong.Peter van Elswyk & Matthew A. Benton - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50.
Lying, speech acts, and commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.
Linguistic Interventions and Transformative Communicative Disruption.Rachel Katharine Sterken - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 417-434.

View all 78 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Literal Meaning.François Récanati - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 47 references / Add more references