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Uniform Applicability
In Marcia Baron & Michael Slote (eds.), Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 129–151 (2009-04-10)
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: Categorical Prescriptiveness Uniformity as a Moral Matter Uniformity Contrasted with Neutrality The Overridingness of Moral Principles.Author's Profile
uniform applicability categorical prescriptiveness categorical prescriptiveness of morality categorical prescriptiveness ‐ then, is not necessary for uniform applicability of moral principle uniformity as a moral matter Anglo‐American tort law and practice of differentiating among people by reference to their physical and mental inadequacies an apology usually indispensable for full rectification of a wrong uniformity contrasted with neutrality overridingness of moral principles
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Citations of this work
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism.Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):399-443.
Attributing error without taking a stand.Caleb Perl & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1453-1471.
Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.
What is at Stake in Debates among Normative Realists?Tristram McPherson - 2013 - Noûs 49 (1):123-146.
A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism.Melis Erdur - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):591-602.
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