Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions

Theory and Decision 89 (3):369-381 (2020)
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Abstract

Two scenarios illustrate uses of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in the construction of choice functions. A comparison is made to the construction of choice functions by the selection of maximal elements. A characterization is given of choice functions that are von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalizable by acyclic, asymmetric binary relations. Two examples illustrate the use of the characterization.

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