69 found
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  1. Libertarianism Without Inequality.Michael Otsuka - 2003 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Michael Otsuka sets out to vindicate left-libertarianism, a political philosophy which combines stringent rights of control over one's own mind, body, and life with egalitarian rights of ownership of the world. Otsuka reclaims the ideas of John Locke from the libertarian Right, and shows how his Second Treatise of Government provides the theoretical foundations for a left-libertarianism which is both more libertarian and more egalitarian than the Kantian liberal theories of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. Otsuka's libertarianism is founded on (...)
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  2. (1 other version)Killing the Innocent in Self‐Defense.Michael Otsuka - 1994 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1):74-94.
    I presented an earlier version of this paper to the Law and Philosophy Discussion Group in Los Angeles, whose members I would like to thank for their comments. In addition, I would also like to thank the following people for reading and providing written or verbal commentary on earlier drafts: Robert Mams, Rogers Albritton, G. A. Cohen, David Copp, Matthew Hanser, Craig Ihara, Brian Lee, Marc Lange, Derk Pereboom, Carol Voeller, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. I owe (...)
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  3. Why it matters that some are worse off than others: An argument against the priority view.Michael Otsuka & Alex Voorhoeve - 2009 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2):171-199.
    We argue that there is a marked shift in the moral weight of an increment in a person's well-being when one moves from a case involving only intra-personal trade-offs to a case involving only inter-personal trads-offs. This shift, we propose, is required by the separateness of persons. We also argue that the Priority View put forward by Parfit cannot account for such a shift. We also outline two alternative views, an egalitarian view and a claims-based view, that can account for (...)
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  4. Equality versus Priority.Michael Otsuka & Alex Voorhoeve - 2018 - In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 65-85.
    We discuss two leading theories of distributive justice: egalitarianism and prioritarianism. We argue that while each has particular merits and shortcomings, egalitarian views more fully satisfy a key requirement of distributive justice: respect for both the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons.
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  5. Why Left‐Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried.Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner & Michael Otsuka - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2):201-215.
    In a recent review essay of a two volume anthology on left-libertarianism (edited by two of us), Barbara Fried has insightfully laid out most of the core issues that confront left-libertarianism. We are each left-libertarians, and we would like to take this opportunity to address some of the general issues that she raises. We shall focus, as Fried does much of the time, on the question of whether left-libertarianism is a well-defined and distinct alternative to existing forms of liberal egalitarianism. (...)
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  6. Incompatibilism and the avoidability of blame.Michael Otsuka - 1998 - Ethics 108 (4):685-701.
    I defend an incompatibilist 'Principle of Avoidable Blame' according to which one is blameworthy for performing an act of a given type only if one could instead have behaved in a manner for which one would have been blameless. First, I demonstrate that this principle is resistant to Harry Frankfurt-type counterexample. Second, I present a positive argument for this principle that appeals to the relation of blame to the 'reactive attitude' of indignation. Finally, I argue against the possibility of blamelessly (...)
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  7. Scanlon and the claims of the many versus the one.Michael Otsuka - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):288-293.
    In "What We Owe to Each Other", T. M. Scanlon argues that one should save the greater number when faced with the choice between saving one life and two or more different lives. It is, Scanlon claims, a virtue of this argument that it does not appeal to the claims of groups of individuals but only to the claims of individuals. I demonstrate that this argument for saving the greater number, indeed, depends, contrary to what Scanlon says, upon an appeal (...)
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  8. Saving lives, moral theory, and the claims of individuals.Michael Otsuka - 2006 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2):109–135.
    Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34 (2006): 109-35.
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  9. Prioritarianism and the Measure of Utility.Michael Otsuka - 2013 - Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (1):1-22.
    I argue that prioritarianism cannot be assessed in abstraction from an account of the measure of utility. Rather, the soundness of this view crucially depends on what counts as a greater, lesser, or equal increase in a person’s utility. In particular, prioritarianism cannot accommodate a normatively compelling measure of utility that is captured by the axioms of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. Nor can it accommodate a plausible and elegant generalization of this theory that has been (...)
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  10. Self-ownership and equality: a lockean reconciliation.Michael Otsuka - 1998 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1):65-92.
    I thank the members of the Law and Philosophy Discussion Group in Los Angeles and those who attended a talk sponsored by the philosophy department at New York University, where I presented earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank G. A. Cohen, Stephen Munzer, Seana Shiffrin, Peter Vallentyne, Andrew Williams, and the editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs, who read and provided written commentary on earlier drafts.
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  11. Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons.Michael Otsuka - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (3):365-380.
    For a prioritarian by contrast to a utilitarian, whether a certain quantity of utility falls within the boundary of one person's life or another's makes the following moral difference: the worse the life of a person who could receive a given benefit, the stronger moral reason we have to confer this benefit on this person. It would seem, therefore, that prioritarianism succeeds, where utilitarianism fails, to ‘take seriously the distinction between persons’. Yet I show that, contrary to these appearances, prioritarianism (...)
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  12. How it makes a moral difference that one is worse off than one could have been.Michael Otsuka - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (2):192-215.
    In this article, I argue that it makes a moral difference whether an individual is worse off than she could have been. Here, I part company with consequentialists such as Parfit and side with contractualists such as Scanlon. But, unlike some contractualists, I reject the view that all that matters is whether a principle can be justified to each particular individual, where such a justification is attentive to her interests, complaints and other claims. The anonymous goodness of a distribution also (...)
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  13.  19
    How to Pool Risks Across Generations: The Case for Collective Pensions.Michael Otsuka - 2023 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    How to Pool Risks across Generations makes the case for the collective provision of pensions, on fair terms of social cooperation. Through the insurance of a mutual association which extends across society and over multiple generations, we share one another's fates by pooling risks across both space and time. Resources are transferred, not simply between different people, but also within the possible future lives of each person: from one's more fortunate to one's less fortunate future selves. The book opens with (...)
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  14. (1 other version)Double effect, triple effect and the trolley problem: squaring the circle in looping cases.Michael Otsuka - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (1):92-110.
    In the Trolley Case (Figure 1), as devised by Philippa Foot and modified by Judith Jarvis Thomson, a runaway trolley (i.e. tram) is headed down a main track and will hit and kill five unless you divert it onto a side track, where it will hit and kill one.
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  15. Skepticism about Saving the Greater Number.Michael Otsuka - 2004 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (4):413-426.
    Suppose that each of the following four conditions obtains: 1. You can save either a greater or a lesser number of innocent people from (equally) serious harm. 2. You can do so at trivial cost to yourself. 3. If you act to save, then the harm you prevent is harm that would not have been prevented if you had done nothing. 4. All other things are equal. A skeptic about saving the greater number rejects the common-sensical claim that you have (...)
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  16. Luck, insurance, and equality.Michael Otsuka - 2002 - Ethics 113 (1):40-54.
    The aim of this article is to refute Ronald Dworkin's claim that the provision of an equal opportunity to insure against risks is sufficient to render differences in people's circumstances that are the result of luck consistent with his theory of equality of resources. Section I addresses bad luck in the circumstances of individuals in the form of mental or physical incapacitation resulting from the vicissitudes of nature. Section II addresses bad luck which is the result of the choices of (...)
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  17. Moral luck: Optional, not brute.Michael Otsuka - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):373-388.
    'Moral luck' refers to the phenomenon whereby one's degree of blameworthiness for what one has done varies on account of factors beyond one's control. Applying concepts of Dworkin's from the domain of distributive justice, I draw a distinction between 'option moral luck,' which is that to which one has exposed oneself as the result of one's voluntary choices, and 'brute moral luck,' which is that which is unchosen and unavoidable. I argue that option moral luck is not ruled out on (...)
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  18.  8
    The Moral-Responsibility Account of Liability to Defensive Killing.Michael Otsuka - 2016 - In Christian Coons & Michael Weber (eds.), The Ethics of Self-Defense. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.
    Some are blameless for posing a threat to the lives of another because they are not morally responsible for being a threat. Others are blameless in spite of their responsibility. On what has come to be known as the “moral-responsibility account” of liability to defensive killing, it is such responsibility, rather than blameworthiness, for threatening another that renders one liable to defensive killing. Moreover, one’s lack of responsibility for being a threat grounds one’s nonliability to defensive killing. The chapter defends (...)
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  19. The paradox of group beneficence.Michael Otsuka - 1991 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (2):132-149.
    An argument against Parfit's view (in his chapter of Reasons and Persons on five mistakes in moral mathematics) that, rather than maximizing the difference one makes as an individual, one should join that group whose members together make the most positive difference in cases involving imperceptible benefits. It is shown how Parfit's defence of this view has the problematic implication either (1) that each outcome is less beneficial than itself or (2) that "less beneficial than" is not transitive.
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  20. Equality, ambition and insurance.Michael Otsuka - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):151-166.
    Inequality is intrinsically bad when and because it is unfair. It follows that the ideal of equality is not necessarily realised by a distribution of resources which is envy-free prior to the resolution of risks against which people have an equal opportunity to insure. Even if the upshot of such an ex ante envyfree distribution is just, it is not necessarily fair.
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  21.  18
    On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy.Michael Otsuka (ed.) - 2011 - Princeton University Press.
    G. A. Cohen was one of the most gifted, influential, and progressive voices in contemporary political philosophy. At the time of his death in 2009, he had plans to bring together a number of his most significant papers. This is the first of three volumes to realize those plans. Drawing on three decades of work, it contains previously uncollected articles that have shaped many of the central debates in political philosophy, as well as papers published here for the first time. (...)
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  22.  43
    The moral responsibility account of liability to defensive killing.Michael Otsuka - 2016 - In Christian Coons & Michael Weber (eds.), The Ethics of Self-Defense. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.
    Some are blameless for posing a threat to the live of another because they are not morally responsible for being a threat. Others are blameless in spite of their responsibility. On what has come to be known as the "moral responsibility account" of liability to defensive killing, it is such responsibility, rather than blameworthiness, for threatening another that renders one liable to defensive killing. Moreover, one's lack of responsibility for being a threat grounds one's nonliability to defensive killing. In "Killing (...)
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  23.  68
    Are deontological constraints irrational?Michael Otsuka - 2011 - In Ralf Bader & John Meadowcroft (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Nozick. Cambridge University Press. pp. 38-58.
    Most deontologists find bedrock in the Pauline doctrine that it is morally objectionable to do evil in order that good will come of it. Uncontroversially, this doctrine condemns the killing of an innocent person simply in order to maximize the sum total of happiness. It rules out the conscription of a worker to his or her certain death in order to repair a fault that is interfering with the live broadcast of a World Cup match that a billion spectators have (...)
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  24.  15
    The Right to Punish.Michael Otsuka - 2003 - In Libertarianism Without Inequality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Offers a Lockean account of a natural right to punish, which is grounded in a natural right of self‐protection. Endorses Warren Quinn's derivation of the right to punish from a right of self‐protection, but argues, against Quinn, that his account will succeed only if one is allowed, when justifying punishment, to appeal to the fact that the punishment of the guilty will deter others. Also argues that Quinn's account will succeed only if the right to engage in lethal measures to (...)
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  25.  97
    Freedom of occupational choice.Michael Otsuka - 2008 - Ratio 21 (4):440-453.
    Cohen endorses the coercive taxation of the talented at a progressive rate for the sake of realizing equality. By contrast, he denies that it is legitimate for the state to engage in the 'Stalinist forcing' of people into one or another line of work in order to bring about a more egalitarian society. He rejects such occupational conscription on grounds of the invasiveness of the gathering and acting upon information regarding people's preferences for different types of work that would be (...)
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  26. Reply to Crisp.Michael Otsuka & Alex Voorhoeve - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (1):109-114.
    In 'Why It Matters that Some Are Worse off than Others,' we offer a new critique of the Priority View. In a recent article, Roger Crisp has argued that our critique is flawed. In this reply, we show that Crisp fails to grapple with, much less defeat, the central claim of our critique. We also show that an example that Crisp offers in support of the Priority View in fact lends support to our critique of that view.
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  27. (1 other version)The Kantian argument for consequentialism.Michael Otsuka - 2009 - Ratio 22 (1):41-58.
    A critical examination of Parfit's attempt to reconcile Kantian contractualism with consequentialism, which disputes his contention that the contracting parties would lack decisive reasons to choose principles that ground prohibitions against harming of the sort to which non-consequentialists have been attracted. 1.
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  28. Are deontological constraints irrational?Michael Otsuka - 2011 - In Ralf Bader & John Meadowcroft (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Nozick. Cambridge University Press.
    Most deontologists find bedrock in the Pauline doctrine that it is morally objectionable to do evil in order that good will come of it. Uncontroversially, this doctrine condemns the killing of an innocent person simply in order to maximize the sum total of happiness. It rules out the conscription of a worker to his or her certain death in order to repair a fault that is interfering with the live broadcast of a World Cup match that a billion spectators have (...)
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  29. Justice as Fairness: Luck Egalitarian, Not Rawlsian.Michael Otsuka - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (3-4):217-230.
    I assess G. A. Cohen's claim, which is central to his luck egalitarian account of distributive justice, that forcing others to pay for people's expensive indulgence is inegalitarian because it amounts to their exploitation. I argue that the forced subsidy of such indulgence may well be unfair, but any such unfairness fails to ground an egalitarian complaint. I conclude that Cohen's account of distributive justice has a non-egalitarian as well as an egalitarian aspect. Each impulse arises from an underlying commitment (...)
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  30. Fair Terms of Social Cooperation Among Equals.Michael Otsuka - forthcoming - Journal of Practical Ethics.
    Rawlsian justice as fairness is neither fundamentally luck egalitarian nor relational egalitarian. Rather, the most fundamental idea is that of society as a fair system of cooperation. Collective pensions provide a case study which illustrates the fruitfulness of conceiving justice in these latter terms. Those who have recently reached the age of majority do not now know how long they will live in retirement or how well any investments they try to save up for their retirement would fare. From the (...)
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  31.  10
    Finding oneself in the other.Michael Otsuka - unknown
    This is the second of three volumes of posthumously collected writings of G. A. Cohen, who was one of the leading, and most progressive, figures in contemporary political philosophy. This volume brings together some of Cohen's most personal philosophical and nonphilosophical essays, many of them previously unpublished. Rich in first-person narration, insight, and humor, these pieces vividly demonstrate why Thomas Nagel described Cohen as a "wonderful raconteur." The nonphilosophical highlight of the book is Cohen's remarkable account of his first trip (...)
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  32. Prerogatives to Depart from Equality.Michael Otsuka - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 58:95-112.
    Should egalitarian justice be qualified by an agent-relative prerogative to act on a preference for—and thereby in a manner that gives rise to or preserves a greater than equal share of the goods of life for—oneself, one's family, loved ones, or friends as compared with strangers? Although many would reply that the answer to this question must be ‘yes’, I shall argue here that the case for such a prerogative to depart from equality is much less far-reaching than one might (...)
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  33. Personal Identity, Substantial Change, and the Significance of Becoming.Michael Otsuka - 2017 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1229-1243.
    According to philosophers who ground your anticipation of future experiences in psychological continuity and connectedness, it is rational to anticipate the experiences of someone other than yourself, such as a self that is the product of fission or of replication. In this article, I concur that it is rational to anticipate the experiences of the product of fission while denying the rationality of anticipating the experiences of a replica. In defending my position, I offer the following explanation of why you (...)
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  34. Appropriating Lockean Appropriation on Behalf of Equality.Michael Otsuka - 2018 - In James Penner & Michael Otsuka (eds.), Property Theory : Legal and Political Perspectives. Cambridge University Press. pp. 121-137.
    I argue that the Lockean 'enough and as good' proviso provides support for egalitarian as opposed to libertarian or sufficientarian claims over worldly resources. These egalitarian claims apply to contemporary advanced industrial societies with money-based economies as well as primitive agrarian barter economies. But the full 'luck egalitarian' complement of equality of opportunity for welfare cannot be derived from a Lockean approach that focuses on our egalitarian claims to unowned bits of the world. For that, we need to reach beyond (...)
     
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  35.  5
    Risk pooling, reciprocity, and voluntary association.Michael Otsuka - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-4.
    What follows is a sketch of three of the main claims of How to Pool Risks across Generations: The Case for Collective Pensions (Otsuka 2023) with which my symposium commentators critically engage: namely, that (1) by efficiently pooling risks across as well as within generations, (2) collective pensions can realize a form of Rawlsian reciprocity involving fair terms of cooperation for mutual advantage, (3) through the voluntary binding agreements of individuals to join a mutual association that provides social insurance. I (...)
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  36.  5
    Replies to Barr, van Ewijk, Heath, Karnein and Schokkaert.Michael Otsuka - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-5.
  37.  39
    Prioritarianism, Population Ethics, and Competing Claims.Michael Otsuka - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Timothy Campbell, Ketan Ramakrishnan & Jimmy Goodrich (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 527–551.
    In his restriction of prioritarianism to cases in which the same people would exist in all the possible outcomes, Parfit stakes out an unstable position, both for himself and more generally. There is no plausible rationale for a prioritarianism that is so restricted, which is consistent with the key features of Parfit’s elaboration and defence of this view and his other commitments. The principles that might be appealed to, in an attempt to justify such a restriction, give rise to a (...)
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  38.  34
    (2 other versions)Liberty, equality, envy, and abstraction.Michael Otsuka - 2004 - In Justine Burley (ed.), Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. Philosophers and their Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 70--78.
    Dworkin's reconciliation of liberty and equality in chapter 3 of 'Sovereign Virtue' presupposes the compossibility of the satisfaction of the envy test and the realization of the principle of abstraction. It is, however, impossible to realize a distribution that is both envy-free and maximally sensitive to plans and preferences. When this conflict between the envy test and the principle of abstraction is brought to light, it will become apparent that Dworkin falls short of a complete reconciliation of liberty and equality.
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  39. Left-libertarianism and liberty forthcoming in debates in political philosophy.Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner & Michael Otsuka - 2009 - In Thomas Christiano & John Christman (eds.), Debates in Political Philosophy. Blackwell.
    I shall formulate and motivate a left-libertarian theory of justice. Like the more familiar rightlibertarianism, it holds that agents initially fully own themselves. Unlike right-libertarianism, it holds that natural resources belong to everyone in some egalitarian manner. Left-libertarianism is, I claim, a plausible version of liberal egalitarianism because it is suitably sensitive to considerations of liberty, security, and equality.
     
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  40.  57
    If One Can’t Lose Such a Right in These Circumstances, One Never Had It in the First Place.Michael Otsuka - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (3):503-509.
    In this article, I press a line of objection to Jonathan Quong's moral status account of liability to defensive harm. The claim on which I rest my critique is captured by the article's title: if one can’t lose such a right in these circumstances, one never had it in the first place.
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  41. Why left-libertarianism is.Michael Otsuka - unknown
    For insightful comments, we thank G. A. Cohen, Barbara Fried, Leif Wenar, Andrew Williams, Jonathan Wolff, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. 1. Barbara Fried, “Left-Libertarianism: A Review Essay,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 (2004): 66–92. This is a review of The Origins of Left-Libertarianism: An Anthology of His- torical Writings and Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, both edited by Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 2000).
     
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  42.  47
    (1 other version)Discussione su "If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?" di G.A. Cohen.Ian Carter, Michael Otsuka & Francesco Saverio Trincia - 2001 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 14 (3):609-634.
    Discussion held in April at a Political Studies Association Roundtable in Manchester, England, on G. A. Cohen’s book If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?. --- Michael Otsuka's contribution sub-titled: "Il personale e politico? Il confine tra pubblico e private nella sfera della giustizia distributiva" = "Is the personal political? The boundary between the public and the private in the realm of distributive justice.".
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  43.  78
    A Rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini.Michael Otsuka - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):37-42.
    In Otsuka ( 1998 ), I endorse an incompatibilist Principle of Avoidable Blame. In this rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini ( 2009 ), I defend this principle against their charge that it is vulnerable to Frankfurt-type counterexample.
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  44.  18
    Commentator.Michael Otsuka - unknown
    he primary aim of Dworkin's essay is to defend the claim that there are objective moral (and aesthetic or otherwise evaluative) truths against a variety of "external" skeptical challenges. These challenges are "external" because they "offer to justify their skeptical claims -- that these [evaluative] domains cannot provide objective truth -- from premises that are not themselves evaluative." (p. 88).
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  45.  64
    Can an incompatibilist outfox a compatibilist hedgehog?Michael Otsuka - 2014 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 19 (4):456-469.
    This article raises some incompatibilist challenges for, and queries some of the implications of, Ronald Dworkin’s arguments in his "Justice for Hedgehogs" (2011), that responsibility is compatible with both determinism and epiphenomenalism.
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  46.  95
    Commentary on Ronald Dworkin's "Objectivity and truth: you'd better believe it".Michael Otsuka - 1996 - Brown Electronic Article Review Service in Moral and Political Philosophy.
    Review of: DWORKIN, R., "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It." Philosophy & Public Affairs, 25: 87–139.
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  47. How to be a Libertarian without being Inegalitarian.Michael Otsuka - unknown
    Article (English translation of French article in Raisons Politiques).
     
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  48.  36
    How to be a Libertarian without being inegalitarian: English version of ‘Comment être libertarien sans être inégalitaire’.Michael Otsuka - 2006 - Raisons Politiques 23 (3):9-22.
    The aim of this article is to display the main lines of a left-libertarian argument I defend in my book Libertarianism without Inequality. I argue that left-libertarian theory can coherently combine robust rights to self-ownership and egalitarian rights to world-ownership. This allows us to oppose paternalism and consequentialism while defending a strongly egalitarian conception of justice. The model I advocate is one of equality of opportunity for welfare, and I show what justifies this choice. I conclude by clarifying one of (...)
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  49.  65
    How to guard against the risk of living too long: the case for collective pensions.Michael Otsuka - 2017 - In David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne & Steven Wall (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 229-251.
    This chapter provides a defense of a type of occupational pension, known as “collective defined contribution”, which is based on the idea that it is possible to limit the employer’s liability to nothing more than a set contribution while retaining many of the benefits of the collectivization of risks of a traditional defined benefit pension. CDC can be defended against a freedom-based objection from the right via an appeal to the following Hobbesian voluntarist justification: CDC constitutes a “Leviathan of Leviathans” (...)
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  50.  11
    Introduction.Michael Otsuka - 2003 - In Libertarianism Without Inequality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
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