Rationalizing two-tiered choice functions through conditional choice

Synthese 190 (6):929-951 (2013)
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Abstract

Set-valued choice functions provide a framework that is general enough to encompass a wide variety of theories that are significant to the study of rationality but, at the same time, offer enough structure to articulate consistency conditions that can be used to characterize some of the theories within this encompassed variety. Nonetheless, two-tiered choice functions, such as those advocated by Isaac Levi, are not easily characterized within the framework of set-valued choice functions. The present work proposes conditional choice functions as the proper carriers of synchronic rationality. The resulting framework generalizes the familiar one mentioned above without emptying it and, moreover, provides a natural setting for two-tiered choice rules

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