The Halfers are right, but many were anyway wrong: Sleeping Beauty Problem

Abstract

In this paper, I will examine the representative halfer and thirder solutions to the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Two solutions give different answers for the probability of today being Monday that the sleeping beauty should rationally assign. Then by examining the definition of events, it is concluded that the representative thirder solution is wrong and the halfers are right, but that the representative halfer solution also contains wrong logical arguments.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,752

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

An Embarrassment for Double-Halfers.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):146-151.
A devastating example for the Halfer Rule.Vincent Conitzer - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1985-1992.
Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty.Alastair Wilson - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (3):axt018.
Imagining and Sleeping Beauty: A Case for Double-Halfers.Mikael Cozic - 2011 - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2):137-143.
Ross on sleeping beauty.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):503-512.
Inertia, Optimism and Beauty.Patrick Hawley - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):85-103.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-09-07

Downloads
21 (#734,423)

6 months
4 (#778,909)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Add more references