An Embarrassment for Double-Halfers

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):146-151 (2012)
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Abstract

“Double-halfers” think that throughout the Sleeping Beauty Problem, Beauty should keep her credence that a fair coin flip came up heads equal to 1/2. I introduce a new wrinkle to the problem that shows even double-halfers can't keep Beauty's credences equal to the objective chances for all coin-flip propositions. This leaves no way to deny that self-locating information generates an unexpected kind of inadmissible evidence

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2012-10-09

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Michael Titelbaum
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3033-3049.
Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution.Laureano Luna - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):1069-1092.
Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson.Darren Bradley - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):683-693.

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References found in this work

Sleeping beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
The relevance of self-locating beliefs.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):555-606.

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