Ross on sleeping beauty

Philosophical Studies 163 (2):503-512 (2013)
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Abstract

In two excellent recent papers, Jacob Ross has argued that the standard arguments for the ‘thirder’ answer to the Sleeping Beauty puzzle lead to violations of countable additivity. The problem is that most arguments for that answer generalise in awkward ways when he looks at the whole class of what he calls Sleeping Beauty problems. In this note I develop a new argument for the thirder answer that doesn't generalise in this way.

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Brian Weatherson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

Centering the Principal Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1897-1915.
What's So Bad About Lying?Sophie Macdonald - 2023 - University of British Columbia Journal of Philosophical Enquiries 1 (4):35-46.

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References found in this work

The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Our knowledge of the internal world.Robert Stalnaker - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Our Knowledge of the Internal World.Robert Stalnaker - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The relevance of self-locating beliefs.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):555-606.

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