The Innateness Charge: Conception and Belief for Reid and Hume

Reid Studies 3 (2):43 (2000)
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Abstract

Hume's notion of conception is closer to Reid's than Reid realizes and may lie behind Hume's charge in the letter to Hugh Blair (1762) that Reid's philosophy "leads us back to innate ideas".

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Catherine Kemp
John Jay College of Criminal Justice (CUNY)

Citations of this work

"Our ideas in experience: Hume's examples in ' of scepticism with regard to the senses'".Catherine Kemp - 2004 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (3):445 – 470.

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