In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 52-74 (2015)

M. Folescu
University of Missouri, Columbia
The present investigation concerns Reid’s explanation of how objects (be they real or nonexistent) are conceived. This paper shows that there is a deep-rooted tension in Reid’s understanding of conception: although the type of conception employed in perception is closely related to the one employed in imagination, three fundamental features distinguish perceptual conception (as the former will be referred to throughout this paper) from imaginative conception (as the latter will be called henceforth). These features would have been ascribed by Reid himself to conception as involved in perception, but not to conception as involved in imagination. He should have recognized them as marking the former as a different kind from the latter, and he should not have hastily lumped perceptual and imaginative conceptions together.
Keywords non-conceptual content  perception  imagination  conceptual content
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.Bertrand Russell - 1911 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:108--28.
Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference.Hartry Field - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Response to Keith Lehrer: Thomas Reid on Common Sense and Morals.Esther Kroeker - 2013 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11 (2):131-143.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Levels of Perceptual Content.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2000 - Philsophical Studies 100 (3):237-54.
Perceptual Experience and its Contents.Josefa Toribio - 2002 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (4):375-392.
Thomas Reid on Acquired Perception.Rebecca Copenhaver - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):285-312.
Image Content.Mohan Matthen - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. pp. 265-290.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.
Perceptual Representation / Perceptual Content.Bence Nanay - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 153-167.


Added to PP index

Total views
808 ( #8,736 of 2,506,374 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #18,539 of 2,506,374 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes