Philosophy of Science 64 (2):245-267 (1997)
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This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on inductive uncertainty and uncomputability
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DOI | 10.1086/392550 |
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):70-72.
Knowledge in Flux. Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States.Peter Gärdenfors - 1988 - Studia Logica 49 (3):421-424.
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Citations of this work BETA
Permissivism, The Value of Rationality, and a Convergence-Theoretic Epistemology.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity.Michael Nielsen - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1461-1491.
Means-Ends Epistemology.O. Schulte - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):1-31.
How Theories of Induction Can Streamline Measurements of Scientific Performance.Slobodan Perović & Vlasta Sikimić - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (2):267-291.
View all 14 citations / Add more citations
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