Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom?

Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194 (2007)
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Abstract

In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of 'luck' and 'Frankfurt-style' objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about 'compatibilism' and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument.

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Author Profiles

Ted Warfield
University of Notre Dame
E. J. Coffman
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Citations of this work

Moral responsibility and the continuation problem.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.
How (not) to attack the luck argument.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.

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