Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ()

Abstract

To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.

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Randolph Clarke
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Personal Autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Defense of Privacy as Control.Leonhard Menges - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (3):385-402.
What is the Difference Between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-16.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

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