Abstract

The author analyses the second phase of the development of Husserl’s phenomenological egology and the transition from nonegological to egological phenomenology. Accepting the necessity of the pure I as a phenomenological residue of the transcendental epoché, a non-constituted transcendence in immanence and the source of the evidence of the ‘I am’, it is analysed in its main aspects – such as, among others, the I-pole and I-substrate of habitualities – and in its traits and roles it plays in the stream of lived experiences of pure consciousness. Thus formulated, pure I will be incorporated into the late concepts of transcendental ego and transcendental intersubjectivity. The shortcomings of such an egological conception of consciousness will also be examined, to which the nonegological theories of Husserl’s followers will not offer an adequate solution, making the debate of the egological character of consciousness present also in contemporary philosophy.