Abortion, embryo destruction and the future of value argument

Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (3):133-135 (2002)
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Abstract

Abortion and embryo destruction prevent a future of value, but that does not make them wrong.Abortion involves the killing of a fetus. One bad thing about killing a fetus is that the fetus is deprived of a future of value. Think of all the things which make your life good and worth living: understanding the world, seeing your children grow into independent, intelligent, and happy people, watching a sunset over the hills, enjoying good times with friends. By killing the fetus, we are depriving it of a future life likely to contain these things. And more. The fetus would likely grow to be a person who would have contributed to the world in many ways—bringing joy to its parents, happiness, and friendship to many. That person would have laboured for society and perhaps even discovered a cure for cancer or developed the first bionic eye.The loss of these possible futures is bad. It makes the killing of a fetus wrong. This is Don Marquis's argument against abortion.1 It is one of the best arguments against abortion which does not rest on theological premises.Another way of putting this is to say that we have a good reason not to kill a fetus. A reason for acting is a fact or circumstance forming a sufficient justification for an action. Or in this case, not to perform an action. We have all sorts of reasons for action. Our reasons often conflict. I may have a good reason to visit my mother and a good reason to take my children to the park. What we have most reason to do is what it is right to do. It is what we should do. If we have most reason not to perform an act, …

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Julian Savulescu
Oxford University

Citations of this work

Killing and Impairing Fetuses.Prabhpal Singh - 2022 - The New Bioethics 28 (2):127-138.
A critique of “the best secular argument against abortion”.C. Strong - 2008 - Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (10):727-731.
Abortion and the Beginning and End of Human Life.Don Marquis - 2006 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (1):16-25.
Abortion and the Beginning and End of Human Life.Don Marquis - 2006 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (1):16-25.
The Moral Inadequacy of Cremation.Toni C. Saad - 2017 - The New Bioethics 23 (3):249-260.

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References found in this work

Deprivations, futures and the wrongness of killing.Don Marquis - 2001 - Journal of Medical Ethics 27 (6):363-369.

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