Moral qualms, future persons, and embryo research

Bioethics 22 (4):218–223 (2008)
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Abstract

Many people have moral qualms about embryo research, feeling that embryos must deserve some kind of protection, if not so much as is afforded to persons. This paper will show that these qualms serve to camouflage motives that are really prudential, at the cost of also obscuring the real ethical issues at play in the debate concerning embryo research and therapeutic cloning. This in turn leads to fallacious use of the Actions/Omissions Distinction and ultimately neglects the duties that we have towards future persons.

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David M. Shaw
University of Basel

Citations of this work

Meta-Reasoning in Making Moral Decisions Under Normative Uncertainty.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2016 - In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński (eds.), Argumentation and Reasoned Action. College Publications. pp. 1093-1104.

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References found in this work

Abortion and the golden rule.R. M. Hare - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (3):201-222.

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