The moral enhancement of human beings is a constant theme in the history of humanity. Today, faced with the threats of a new, globalised world, concern over this matter is more pressing. For this reason, the use of biotechnology to make human beings more moral has been considered. However, this approach is dangerous and very controversial. The purpose of this article is to argue that the use of another new technology, AI, would be preferable to achieve this goal. Whilst several (...) proposals have been made on how to use AI for moral enhancement, we present an alternative that we argue to be superior to other proposals that have been developed. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide some evidence for the view that a common charge against those who adopt vegetarianism is that they would be sentimental. I argue that this charge is pressed frequently by those who adopt moral absolutism, a position that I reject, before exploring the question if vegetarianism might make sense. I discuss three concerns that might motivate those who adopt vegetarian diets, including a concern with the human health and environmental costs of some alternative diets, a concern (...) about inflicting pain on animals, and a concern with the killing of animals. While I argue that vegetarianism does not make sense in some situations, I hope that this paper shows that there are many good reasons why the adoption of vegetarian, and—even more so—vegan diets might be appropriate in some situations. In carving out this position, I focus primarily on the question whether a morally relevant distinction between the killing of plants and the killing of animals should be made. I engage primarily with the views of two of the most prominent authors on this issue, arguing that neither Peter Singer nor Tom Regan provide a satisfactory account on the ethics of killing nonhuman organisms. Two views are challenged in particular, the view that relatively simple animals such as molluscs, as well as plants, lack awareness, and the view that animals without a preference to continue living stand to lose little or nothing by being killed. I provide some evidence to support the claim that many share my view that it is more problematic to kill animals than to kill plants, before analyzing why some suppress the negative feelings they associate with killing animals. By exploring these issues I hope to shed some light on the issue of whether the feelings of those who adopt vegetarianism are sentimental or make sense, and to stimulate reflection amongst those with an interest in food ethics. (shrink)

The argument has been made that future generations of human beings are being harmed unjustifiably by the actions individuals commit today. This paper addresses what it might mean to harm future generations, whether we might harm them, and what our duties toward future generations might be. After introducing the Global Health Impact (GHI) concept as a unit of measurement that evaluates the effects of human actions on the health of all organisms, an incomplete theory of human justice is proposed. Having (...) shown that the negative GHIs of our current generation cause unfair harm to future generations, I argue that each human being must be allocated a fair threshold of negative GHIs that should not be exceeded. By emphasising the need to consider all the GHIs of human actions, the theory of human justice developed here is highly relevant to evaluate human actions that might affect future generations, for example those related to climate change. (shrink)

Many scholars have argued that the distinction between the natural and the unnatural does not have any moral relevance, either because the distinction does not make sense or because, even if it does make sense, it does not make any moral sense. Before we can decide on the latter, we must therefore determine first whether a semantic distinction can be made. In this article, I argue that the distinction can be maintained. In spite of the fact that the categories of (...) the natural and the unnatural are blurred as no unnatural things are completely unnatural, I argue that we can meaningfully distinguish between different types of unnaturalness along the natural-unnatural spectrum. To my knowledge, this article is the first publication to distinguish between three types of unnaturalness. (shrink)

ABSTRACT On 22 January 2001, the UK became the first country to approve of embryonic stem cell research by passing the Human Fertilisation (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001, which legislated new research purposes for which early embryos can be used, in addition to those approved by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. Legal advisory committees, most notably the Chief Medical Officer's Expert Group and the House of Lords’ Select Committee, have offered various reasons, which can also be found in the (...) ethics literature, to justify this change. Those examined here are the views that: 1. Early embryos lack relevant qualities (or ‘the argument from lack of qualities’) and 2. Early embryos only have a potentiality to become humans with moral status (or ‘the argument from potentiality’). The validity of these arguments is questioned and a case is made for egalitarian speciesism. Embryos have moral status (used here in the restricted sense of the status possessed by all members of the class of beings which deserve the greatest moral significance in equal measure). They have more value than the value that should be assigned to nonhuman beings from the start of fertilisation. Current UK legislation on embryo research is immoral. (shrink)

The vegan project is defined as the project that strives for radical legal reform to pass laws that would reserve the consumption of animal products to a very narrow range of situations, resulting in vegan diets being the default diets for the majority of human beings. Two objections that have been raised against such a project are described. The first is that such a project would jeopardise the nutritional adequacy of human diets. The second is that it would alienate human (...) beings from nature. It is argued that neither undermines the vegan project. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to further our understanding of the “GM is unnatural” view, and of the critical response to it. While many people have been reported to hold the view that GM is unnatural, many policy-makers and their advisors have suggested that the view must be ignored or rejected, and that there are scientific reasons for doing so. Three “typical” examples of ways in which the “GM is unnatural” view has been treated by UK policy-makers and their (...) advisors are explored. These are the Government’s position (DEFRA Report), the account of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, and the position of Nigel Halford, a scientist with an advisory role to the Government. I show that their accounts fail to mount a convincing critique. Then, I draw on an empirical research project held during 2003–2004 at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the north east of England. Scientists met with non-scientists in a range of facilitated one-to-one conversations (“exchanges”) on various environmental issues, one of which was on GM. Our findings show that some scientists who rejected the “GM is unnatural” view struggled to do so consistently. Their struggle is interpreted in terms of a conflict between a so-called “scientific” worldview, and a different worldview that underlies the concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view. This worldview is explored further by an examination of their concerns. What distinguishes this worldview from the “scientific” worldview is that the instrumentalization of the nonhuman world is questioned to a larger extent. I conclude that, because the underlying concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view were not with GM as such, yet with a worldview that was considered to be problematic, and of which many GM applications were held to be expressions, policy-makers and their advisors should reflect on the critical worldview of those who claim that GM is unnatural if they want to engage seriously with their concerns. (shrink)

This article addresses the question whether Whiteheadians should be vegetarians in two ways. First, I question whether Whitehead should have been a vegetarian to be consistent, arguing that his omnivorous diet was inconsistent with his own philosophy. Second, I evaluate the works of three distinguished Whiteheadian philosophers on the ethics of vegetarianism. I argue that Charles Birch, John Cobb, and Jay McDaniel have prioritized animals justifiably over other organisms, yet that Birch and Cobb fail to do justice to the lives (...) of other animals, and that the account provided by McDaniel fails to provide a convincing argument for minimal moral vegetarianism. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have found inspiration in the writings of Alfred Whitehead to develop their ideas on environmental and animal ethics. I explore the writings of Charles Hartshorne and Daniel Dombrowski to address the question of whether Whiteheadians should be vegetarians. I conclude that there is a morally relevant distinction between plants and animals, based on the Whiteheadian view that animals have higher grades of experience, and that this distinction grounds a moral duty to adopt minimal moral veganism.

This paper uses the imaginary case of Gemma, presented initially at the International Swine Flu Conference (London, March 2010), to discuss whether a nurse who disagrees with most ways in which animals are farmed would be wronged if she contracted swine flu. It is argued that the farm animal sector has contributed to the emergence of H1N1 flu, and that the sector in general contributes significantly to the burden of human disease. The aim of this paper is to promote debate (...) on the question as to whether a range of systems used by the farm animal sector survive moral scrutiny in light of these concerns. (shrink)

The field of leadership studies frequently focuses on defining leadership traits in abstraction from the context in which leadership operates. The first aim of this article is to provide a brief overview of reasons why this might be the case. Reasons include: leadership studies being dominated by the perspectives of leaders; the lack of definition and visibility of followership studies; the status and limitations of much qualitative research; and a predominant focus on good leadership. Consequently, many people who experience the (...) effects of leadership, and particularly those of bad leadership, do not recognise their experiences in the literature. However, recognising that followers who experience bad leadership personally increasingly engage in autoethnographic studies, my second aim is to draw out some examples of bad leadership from the autoethnographic literature, as well as their effects. In spite of its negative effects, bad leadership frequently remains unchallenged. My third aim is to explain why this might be the case, where I argue that this stems partly from the pitfalls of autoethnographic studies. I also sketch how these pitfalls might be overcome and how doing so and adopting the principle of ‘accountability for reasonableness’ might help to tackle bad leadership. (shrink)

Dan Brock has asserted that those who claim that the early embryo has full moral status are not consistent, and that the rationality of such a position is dubious when it is adopted from a religious perspective. I argue that both claims are flawed. Starting with the second claim, which is grounded in Brock’s moral abstolutist position, I argue that Brock has provided no argument on why the religious position should be less rational than the secular position. With regard to (...) the first claim, I argue that those who hold the view that the early embryo has full moral status can be consistent even if they do not oppose sexual reproduction, even if they do not grieve as much over the loss of embryos as over the loss of other humans, even if they prefer to save one child instead of 100 embryos in the event of fire, and even if they do not accept racism and sexism. (shrink)

The scope of embryo research in the UK has been expanded by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Regulations 2001. Two advisory bodies—the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group and the House of Lords’ Select Committee—presented various arguments in favour of embryo research. One of these is the view that, just as lottery tickets have relatively little value before the draw because of the low probability of their being the winning ticket, early embryos have relatively little value because of the presumed low (...) probability that they will mature into more developed embryos. This argument from probability is questioned in this paper, as well as the contention that allowing embryo destruction is incompatible with the view that embryos have full moral status. Although I challenge Savulescu’s view that early embryos should be entered into a lottery in which they are subjected to the probability of being destroyed , a revised version of Thomson’s analogy of the famous violinist defies the view that the position that the embryo has full moral status is incompatible with qualified support for embryo destruction. (shrink)

This article discusses the feedback on students’ ethics essays provided by eight markers in the Faculty of Medical Sciences at Newcastle University. It highlights significant shortcomings, including failures to identify instances where students had failed to select and to conclude on ethical issues, logical errors, misunderstandings of ethical arguments made in the literature, instances of simple deference, and a lack of critical engagement with relevant literature. Markers also made a large number of linguistic errors and, on many occasions, failed to (...) explain clearly what they meant. Some indication is given of what the cost of this might be to health care students as well as to those who are affected by the quality of their ethical decisions. The article concludes by providing some guidance on how this cost might be reduced at Newcastle University as well as in many other institutions where similar problems are likely to exist. (shrink)

Partly in response to rising rates of obesity, many governments have published healthy eating advice. Focusing on health advice related to the consumption of animal products (APs), I argue that the individualistic paradigm that prevails must be replaced by a radically new approach that emphasizes the duty of all human beings to restrict their negative “Global Health Impacts” (GHIs). If they take human rights seriously, many governments from nations with relatively large negative GHIs—including the Australian example provided here—must develop strategies (...) to reduce their citizens’ negative GHIs. As the negative GHIs associated with the consumption of many APs are excessive, it is my view that many governments ought to adopt a qualified ban on the consumption of APs. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In a paper published in Bioethics, Jason Eberl has argued that early embryos are not persons and should not be granted the status possessed by them.1 Eberl bases this position upon the following claims: (1) The early embryo has a passive potentiality for development into a person. (2) The early embryo has not established both ‘unique genetic identity’ and ‘ongoing ontological identity’, which are necessary conditions for ensoulment. (3) The early embryo has a low probability of developing into a (...) more developed embryo. This paper examines these claims. I argue against (1) that a plausible view is that the early embryo has an active potentiality to grow into a more developed embryo. Against (2), I argue that neither ‘unique genetic identity’ nor ‘ongoing ontological identity’ are necessary conditions for ensoulment, and that ‘ongoing ontological identity’ is established between early embryos and more developed embryos. Against (3), I argue that the fact that the early embryo has a low probability of developing into a more developed embryo, if true, does not warrant the conclusion that the early embryo is not a person. If Eberl is right that the human soul is that which organises the activities of a human being and that ensouled humans are persons, embryos are persons from conception. (shrink)

In a previous work, I argued that all human beings should possess the right to adequate health protection and that we have good reasons to believe that not all human beings are or will be able to enjoy this right. I introduced the ?Global Health Impact? or ?GHI? concept as a unit of measurement to evaluate the effects of human actions on the health of human and nonhuman organisms and argued that the negative GHIs produced by our current generation jeopardise (...) the right to adequate health protection of future generations unjustifiably. In this article, this incomplete theory of human justice is applied to the negative GHIs associated with the consumption of farmed animal products. Since the negative GHIs of such products generally exceed those associated with other diets, I argue that those who exceed their fair share of negative GHIs might curtail their consumption and that the costs of reducing negative GHIs in this domain might be lower than the costs associated with other things that could be done to reduce negative GHIs. (shrink)

Christianity has contributed to the development of a strong anthropocentric ethic. Christian theologians have developed new ways of thinking about the place of humans in nature, often by focussing on the Godhumanity relationship. Thinking about the third component of the metaphysical trinity, nature, has largely remained unchanged. Christian theology needs to make an ontological detour or tour de force to overcome lingering materialist and dualist conceptions of nature, and to embrace key aspects of process thought, most notably panexperientialism. This will (...) pave the way for the required weak anthropocentric ethic. (shrink)

A significant stimulus for co-editing a book on AI ethics comes from a collaboration between Francisco Lara and Jan Deckers that started when Francisco spent some time, in 2017, as a visiting researcher in the School of Medicine at Newcastle University (United Kingdom). Both of us had been interested for quite some time in the ethics of human enhancement by biotechnological means. Both saw significant problems with these ambitions and associated technologies, recognising at the same time the value of, and (...) the need for a particular type of human enhancement, the improvement of our moral skills. This collaboration resulted in the idea that artificial intelligence (AI) might potentially fulfil a useful role in this respect, and led to the publication of an article that makes a case for designing and using ‘Artificial Intelligence as a Socratic Assistant for Moral Enhancement’ (Lara and Deckers 2020). Francisco subsequently developed this idea, arguing that such a virtual assistant might be even better than a human being in morally enhancing AI users (Lara 2021), whilst Jan spent some time thinking through the nature of the unnatural or artificial (Deckers 2021). Meanwhile, both of us developed a greater awareness of the moral problems and opportunities of AI in general, and of the urgent need to explore, resolve, and govern the ethical issues raised by AI. (shrink)

There is a dearth of academic research on the ethics of pigeon racing. We argue that pigeon racing is associated with significant benefits and disadvantages, but that the benefits that have been associated with it can be provided by alternative practices. Disadvantages include the competitive element associated with racing, which creates a strong incentive to kill birds where this is not in their best interests, as well as the welfare issues related to transportation, the widowhood system, the races themselves, and (...) the use of performance-enhancing drugs. Whilst some of these disadvantages can be diminished, we argue that an ethical form of pigeon racing is not possible, and that it therefore ought to be prohibited. In the final part of this article, we question whether the moral problems associated with pigeon racing include the keeping of pigeons per se. On this issue, we argue that keeping pigeons does pose moral problems, but that more research is needed to explore whether these might be relatively minor compared to the problems associated with de-domesticating pigeons. The moral implications of our research extend beyond the world of pigeon racing as similar arguments should be used to question the racing and keeping of many other animals. (shrink)

In England and Wales, there is significant controversy on the law related to abortion. Recent discussions have focussed predominantly on the health professional's right to conscientious objection. This article argues for a comprehensive overhaul of the law from the perspective of an author who adopts the view that all unborn human beings should be granted the prima facie right to life. It is argued that, should the law be modified in accordance with this stance, it need not imply that health (...) professionals should enjoy an unqualified right to object to participating in the provision of abortion. Indeed, it is proposed that – in some situations – women should be granted a positive right to abortion. While the focus of this article is on changing the law in England and Wales, it is hoped that the position developed here will also inspire legal debate and reform elsewhere. (shrink)

The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) developed a ‘Working Definition of Antisemitism’ in 2016. Whilst the definition has received a significant amount of media attention, we are not aware of any comprehensive philosophical analysis. This article analyses this definition. We conclude that the definition and its list of examples ought to be rejected. The urgency to do so stems from the fact that pro-Israel activists can and have mobilised the IHRA document for political goals unrelated to tackling antisemitism, notably to (...) stigmatise and silence critics of the Israeli government. This causes widespread self-censorship, has an adverse impact on freedom of speech, and impedes action against the unjust treatment of Palestinians. We also identify intrinsic problems in the way the definition refers to criticism of Israel similar ‘to that leveled against any other country’, ambiguous wording about ‘the power of Jews as a collective’, lack of clarity as to the Jewish people’s ‘right to self-determination’, and its denial of obvious racism. We consider alternative definitions and prefer one like the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) definition, ‘hostility to or prejudice against Jews’, with the addition of the words ‘as Jews’. We recognise that the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA) can play a useful purpose in illustrating the shortcomings of the IHRA definition. However, we do not advocate promoting it as the prime international definition. Indeed, we question the efficacy of using complex new definitions to combat racism against Jews or other groups, and instead advocate combatting it through collective action across societies. (shrink)

Review of the book Feral: Rewilding the Land, Sea, and Human Life by George Monbiot, Penguin Books, London 2014.

This article surveys and analyses the reflections on medical ethics teaching by colleagues teaching in United Kingdom (UK) medical schools in the early 2020s. Participants were recruited mainly by using the worldwide web to identify 64 people from 41 UK medical schools who were thought to contribute to teaching medical ethics based on their internet profiles. Twenty-three people responded. The survey data reveals that many staff are happy with the provision of medical ethics teaching, but also that some are concerned (...) about the quality of provision due to concerns with staff expertise and teaching time. In spite of the fact that the General Medical Council (GMC) and other organisations are perceived to have contributed to raising the profile of medical ethics, there is significant concern with how it is embedded within local UK medical curricula. Some participants contributed hardly or not at all to research in medical ethics, where one attributed this decline in research to the pandemic. Future work will need to address what can be done to improve the provision of medical ethics teaching to address some of these findings and to survey and analyse how perceptions might have changed in light of recent challenges and developments. (shrink)

En tiempos recientes, el magisterio de la Iglesia Católica publicó dos textos influyentes con pertinencia para la ética animal: el Catecismo de la Iglesia Católica y la carta encíclica Laudato Si’. Estos textos se examinan en este artículo, centrándose en el consumo humano de animales para la alimentación. Si bien el concepto de ‘valor intrínseco’, que ha dominado el trabajo en ética animal, se aplica a los animales no humanos, no existe un análisis riguroso de lo que podría significar este (...) concepto y de lo que su reconocimiento podría implicar para nuestras relaciones con los animales no humanos. Esto es problemático. Más importante aún, rechazo la perspectiva antropocéntrica fuerte que sustenta estos textos, en la que los animales no humanos son valorados casi exclusivamente de manera instrumental. La perspectiva antropocéntrica alternativa y moderada que esbozo exige un veganismo moral calificado, una posición que se defiende contra cuatro críticas potenciales. (shrink)

This book presents the reader with a comprehensive and structured understanding of the ethics of Artificial Intelligence (AI). It describes the main ethical questions that arise from the use of AI in different areas, as well as the contribution of various academic disciplines such as legal policy, environmental sciences, and philosophy of technology to the study of AI. AI has become ubiquitous and is significantly changing our lives, in many cases, for the better, but it comes with ethical challenges. These (...) challenges include issues with the possibility and consequences of autonomous AI systems, privacy and data protection, the development of a surveillance society, problems with the design of these technologies and inequalities in access to AI technologies. This book offers specialists an instrument to develop a rigorous understanding of the main debates in emerging ethical questions around AI. The book will be of great relevance to experts in applied and technology ethics and to students pursuing degrees in applied ethics and, more specifically, in AI ethics. (shrink)

The negative global health impacts (GHIs) associated with the consumption of farmed animal products are wide-ranging and morally significant. This paper considers four options that policy-makers might adopt to curtail the negative GHIs associated with the consumption of farmed animal products. These options are: 1. to introduce a ban on the consumption of farmed animal products; 2. to increase the costs of farmed animal products; 3. to educate people about the negative GHIs associated with the consumption of farmed animal products; (...) and 4. to introduce a qualified ban on the consumption of farmed animal products. I argue that the fourth option is the most effective and, provided that policy-makers think that the negative GHIs associated with the consumption of farmed animal products are sufficiently great and that a total ban would be unfair, it is the political strategy that must be preferred over the available alternatives. (shrink)