Authors
Marta Jorba
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Abstract
This paper explores the relation of thought and the stream of consciousness in the light of an ontological argument raised against cognitive phenomenology views. I argue that the ontological argument relies on a notion of ‘processive character’ that does not stand up to scrutiny and therefore it is insufficient for the argument to go through. I then analyse two more views on what ‘processive character’ means and argue that the process-part account best captures the intuition behind the argument. Following this view, I reconstruct the ontological argument and argue that it succeeds in establishing that some mental episodes like judging, understanding and occurrent states of thought do not enter into the stream but fails to exclude episodes like entertaining. Contrary to what it might seem, this conclusion fits well with cognitive phenomenology views, given that, as I show, there is a way for non-processive mental episodes to be fundamentally related to processive ones, such that they cannot be excl..
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DOI 10.1080/09672559.2015.1100210
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

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Citations of this work BETA

Phenomenal Concepts: Neither Circular nor Opaque.E. Diaz-Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1186-1199.
Fenomenologia Cognitiva.Marta Jorba - 2017 - Quaderns de Filosofia 4 (2).
Quaderns de Filosofia IV, 2.Quad Fia - 2017 - Quaderns de Filosofia 4 (2).

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