Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212 (2008)

Authors
Randolph Clarke
Florida State University
Abstract
An autonomous reason for intending to A would be a reason for so intending that is not, and will not be, a reason for A-ing. Some puzzle cases, such as the one that figures in the toxin puzzle, suggest that there can be such reasons for intending, but these cases have special features that cloud the issue. This paper describes cases that more clearly favour the view that we can have practical reasons of this sort. Several objections to this view are considered and rejected. Finally, it is considered whether the existence of such reasons would conflict with an attractive coherence principle linking the rationality of intending with that of acting as intended. The paper concludes with a qualified affirmation of autonomous reasons for intending.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400801886181
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-Causal Account.Carl Ginet - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):219-228.
Because She Wanted To.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35.
Responsibility.J. Corlett - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):1-33.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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