Leibniz on Perceptual Distinctness, Activity, and Sensation

Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (1):49-77 (2015)
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Abstract

Leibniz explains both activity and sensation in terms of the relative distinctness of perception. This paper argues that the systematic connection between activity and sensation is illuminated by Leibniz’s use of distinctness in analyzing each. Leibnizian sensation involves two levels of activity: on one level, the relative forcefulness of an expression enables certain expressions to stand out against the perceptual field, but in addition to this there is an activity of the mind that enables sensory experience. This connection of mental activity and perceptual distinctness enables us to better appreciate the fundamental role perceptual distinctness plays in Leibniz’s theory of sensation.

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2015-09-03

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Larry M. Jorgensen
Skidmore College

Citations of this work

Du Châtelet on Freedom, Self-Motion, and Moral Necessity.Julia Jorati - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (2):255-280.
Wolff, Baumgarten, and the Technical Idiom of Post-Leibnizian Philosophy of Mind.Patrick R. Leland - 2018 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 21 (1):129-148.
Leibniz and the Molyneux Problem.Bridger Ehli - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):8.
Brandom's Leibniz.Zachary Micah Gartenberg - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (1):73-102.

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References found in this work

Was Leibniz Confused about Confusion?Stephen M. Puryear - 2005 - The Leibniz Review 15:95-124.

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