Abstract

The early modern writings of John Locke are important not for their originality or coherence but for what they offer in understanding the ideological grounds of capitalist economics. Locke offers a justification of inequality in terms of the apparently meritocratic idea of equality – not the equality between people but rather the equivalence between the work of each isolated individual and their reward. This justification of inequality in terms of the work of individuals is anchored in a quite specific conception of work, which I call the vulgar concept of work. According to this conception, work is located in the unmediated action of an isolated individual at a particular moment in time and place. While this vulgar concept of work has historically been and today is central in justifying inequality, this concept is radically at odds with the reality of work and also with key moments in Locke’s own writings, in which there are at least four different concepts of work. It is not simply that Locke maintains an indefensible concept of work but rather that there is a certain awareness of this indefensibility in Locke and in the waves of liberal individualists who follow him. In order to navigate these contradictions, and in an effort ultimately to justify inequality at all costs, Locke has recourse to a profound set of metaphysical presuppositions regarding isolation, separation and origin. On the one hand Locke’s concept of work is incoherent and inconsistent. On the other, despite his apparent empiricism and demand for clarity of concepts, Locke’s writings and the politics he bequeathed rest on a fantastic metaphysics that seeks constantly to obscure and discredit the ongoing work of others.