Blanshard’s Critique of Ethical Subjectivism

Idealistic Studies 20 (2):140-154 (1990)
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Abstract

Brand Blanshard devotes a substantial part of his book Reason and Goodness to a discussion of ethical subjectivism. It need hardly be said that his discussion is critical; Blanshard is a thoroughgoing ethical objectivist. Nevertheless, although he rejects subjectivism as an ethical theory, he is fully appreciative of the importance of subjective elements—emotions, feelings, attitudes—in our ordinary, practical moral activities. He recognizes these, along with reason, to be essential parts of the good life for human beings.

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