Can Colour Be Reduced to Anything?

Philosophy of Science 63 (S3):S134-S142 (1996)
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Abstract

C. L. Hardin has argued that the colour opponency of the vision system leads to chromatic subjectivism: chromatic sensory states reduce to neurophysiological states. Much of the force of Hardin's argument derives from a critique of chromatic objectivism. On this view chromatic sensory states are held to reduce to an external property. While I agree with Hardin's critique of objectivism it is far from clear that the problems which beset objectivism do not apply to the subjectivist position as well. I develop a critique of subjectivism that parallels Hardin's antiobjectivist argument.

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Author's Profile

Don Dedrick
University of Guelph

Citations of this work

Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Color realism redux.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):52-59.
Why not color physicalism without color absolutism?Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.
Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?Adam Pautz - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):44-45.

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References found in this work

Biological functions and perceptual content.Mohan Matthen - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (January):5-27.
What is color vision?David R. Hilbert - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):351-70.
Color vision: Content versus experience.Mohan Matthen - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):46-47.

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