Can color be reduced to anything?

Philosophy of Science Supplement 3 (3):134-42 (1996)
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Abstract

C. L. Hardin has argued that the colour opponency of the vision system leads to chromatic subjectivism: chromatic sensory states reduce to neurophysiological states. Much of the force of Hardin's argument derives from a critique of chromatic objectivism. On this view chromatic sensory states are held to reduce to an external property. While I agree with Hardin's critique of objectivism it is far from clear that the problems which beset objectivism do not apply to the subjectivist position as well. I develop a critique of subjectivism that parallels Hardin's anti-objectivist argument.

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Don Dedrick
University of Guelph

Citations of this work

Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Color realism redux.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):52-59.
Why not color physicalism without color absolutism?Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.
Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?Adam Pautz - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):44-45.

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