Philosophy of Language and Meta-Ethics

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):587 - 594 (2004)
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Meta-ethical discussions commonly distinguish 'subjectivism' from 'emotivism', or 'expressivism'. But Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have argued that plausible assumptions in the philosophy of language entail that expressivism collapses into subjectivism. Though there have been responses to their argument, I think the responses have not adequately diagnosed the real weakness in it. I suggest my own diagnosis, and defend expressivism as a viable theory distinct from subjectivism



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Citations of this work

Recent work in expressivism.Neil Sinclair - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):136-147.

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References found in this work

A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.
A problem for expressivism.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):239–251.
A problem for expressivism.F. Jackson & P. Pettit - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):239-251.

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