A problem for confirmation theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy

Philosophical Studies 173 (2):437-449 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the paper explores four different ways for the confirmation theorist to come to terms with the problem, and argues that none of them are successful

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Martin Jönsson
Lund University

References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
A treatise on probability.John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.

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