Martin Heidegger: Metaphysikkritik als Begriffsproblemaktik [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 26 (4):749-750 (1973)
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Abstract

Bucher reads Heidegger’s thought as a contribution to the "problem of the concept". Heidegger says in Being and Time that the meaning of Being must be "conceived in a way of its own, essentially contrasting with the concepts in which entities acquire their determinate signification." Heidegger’s thought is construed, therefore, not as an attack upon all conceptualization but as an attempt to renew the conceptual terms in which we think upon Being. The focus of Bucher’s analysis is Heidegger’s critique of Western metaphysics which he interprets as Heidegger’s critique of the traditional mode of conceptualization. Since it is clear that Heidegger himself does not consciously formulate his problem in this way, Bucher claims that he is dealing with the unthought implications of Heidegger’s work, rather than with his explicit expressions. This accords with Heidegger’s own counsel that we look for what is still unthought in a philosopher’s thought. The heart of the book is the last three chapters in which a "search for a new understanding of the concept" is undertaken, and in which Bucher argues that Heidegger’s repudiation of metaphysics constitutes an implicit, formally negative mode of conceptualizing a post-metaphysical understanding of Being. This contradicts the letter of Heidegger’s thought, Bucher concedes, but is in keeping with Heidegger’s own approach towards the great thinkers. Bucher’s proposal is quite interesting and is perhaps a sign of a new movement among philosophers to appropriate for philosophy Heidegger’s own critique of philosophy.—J. D. C.

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