Perspectives on Science 14 (3):318-346 (2006)

Abstract
Lakatos is considered to be a Popperian who adapted his Hegelian-Marxist training to critical philosophy. I claim this is too narrow and misses Lakatos' goal of understanding scientific inquiry as heuristic inquiry—something he did not find in Popper, but found in Polanyi. Archival material shows that his ‘new method' struggled to overcome what he saw as the Popperian handicap, by using Polanyi
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DOI 10.1162/posc.2006.14.3.318
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) - 1970 - Cambridge University Press.
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.Karl Raimund Popper - 1972 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Lakatos Between Marxism and the Hungarian Heuristic Tradition.Val Dusek - 2015 - Studies in East European Thought 67 (1-2):61-73.
Relations Between Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi.Struan Jacobs & Phil Mullins - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (3):426-435.
Towards Teaching Chemistry as a Language.Pierre Laszlo - 2013 - Science & Education 22 (7):1669-1706.

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Lakatos' Modification of Popper's Falsificationism.Mo Liu - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh

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