The Inflexibility of Relative Truth

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):409-418 (2010)
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Abstract

The ideology of relative truth is inflexible in two ways. Firstly, what's true-for-J is closed under entailment. This is a problem for using truth-relativism to solve the preface puzzle about knowledge. Secondly, it is plausible that vagueness gives rise to some questions having multiple ‘acceptable’ answers, and other questions having no ‘acceptable’ answer. Even if truth-relativism can express the former idea, it can't express the latter. I propose an ideology that is not so rigid. It is preferable to relative truth

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Author's Profile

Alexander Jackson
Boise State University

References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Wang's paradox.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):201--32.
The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.

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