Making sense of relative truth

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339 (2005)
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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to make sense of relativism about truth. There are two key ideas. (1) To be a relativist about truth is to allow that a sentence or proposition might be assessment-sensitive: that is, its truth value might vary with the context of assessment as well as the context of use. (2) Making sense of relativism is a matter of understanding what it would be to commit oneself to the truth of an assessment-sensitive sentence or proposition.

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John MacFarlane
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Ontological anti-realism.David J. Chalmers - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
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Relativism and disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.

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References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
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Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.

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