Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Relativism

In Knowledge and practical interests. New York: Oxford University Press (2005)
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Abstract

Relativism about knowledge-attributions is the thesis that knowledge attributions express propositions the truth of which is relative to a judge. On this view, a knowledge attribution may express a proposition that is true for one judge, and false for another. This chapter explains and criticizes various versions of relativism about knowledge attributions.

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10.1093/0199288038.003.0008

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Jason Stanley
Yale University

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