Probabilities Cannot Be Rationally Neglected

Mind 125 (499):759-762 (2016)
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Abstract

In response to Smith, I argue that probabilities cannot be rationally neglected. I show that Smith’s proposal for ignoring low-probability outcomes must, on pain of violating dominance reasoning, license taking arbitrarily high risk for arbitrarily little reward.

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10.1093/mind/fzv151

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Yoaav Isaacs
Baylor University

Citations of this work

In Defense of Fanaticism.Hayden Wilkinson - 2022 - Ethics 132 (2):445-477.
Totalism without Repugnance.Jacob M. Nebel - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich & Ketan Ramakrishnan (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 200-231.

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