Causal reasoning, causal probabilities, and conceptions of causation

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (4):761-768 (2012)
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Abstract

The present paper deals with the tools that can be used to represent causation and to reason about it and, specifically, with their diversity. It focuses on so-called “causal probabilities”—that is, probabilities of effects given one of their causes—and critically surveys a recent paper in which Joyce argues that the values of these probabilities do not depend on one’s conception of causation. I first establish a stronger independence claim: I show that the very definition of causal probabilities is independent of one’s conception of causation. Second, I investigate whether causal probabilities indeed take the same values under their different possible definitions.

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Isabelle Drouet
Université Paris-Sorbonne

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Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

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